“What He Said.” The Transformative Potential of the Use of Copyrighted Content in Political Campaigns —or— How a Win for Mitt Romney Might Have Been a Victory for Free Speech by Keller, Deidre
Florida A&M University College of Law 
Scholarly Commons @ FAMU Law 
Journal Publications Faculty Works 
2014 
“What He Said.” The Transformative Potential of the Use of 
Copyrighted Content in Political Campaigns —or— How a Win for 
Mitt Romney Might Have Been a Victory for Free Speech 
Deidre Keller 
Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.law.famu.edu/faculty-research 
 Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, First Amendment Commons, and the Intellectual Property 
Law Commons 
 Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2243992 
 
497 
“What He Said.”  The Transformative 
Potential of the Use of Copyrighted 
Content in Political Campaigns 
—or— 
How a Win for Mitt Romney Might 
Have Been a Victory for Free Speech 
Deidré A. Keller* 
ABSTRACT 
In January 2012 Mitt Romney’s campaign received a  
cease-and-desist letter charging, among other things, that its use of 
news footage concerning Newt Gingrich’s ethics problems in the House 
of Representatives constituted a violation of NBC’s copyright.  This is 
just the latest such charge and came amidst similar allegations 
against the Gingrich and Bachmann campaigns and in the wake of 
similar allegations against both the McCain and Obama campaigns in 
2008.  Such allegations have plagued political campaigns as far back 
as Reagan’s in 1984.  The existing literature is nearly devoid of a 
consideration of such uses as political speech protected by the First 
Amendment.  Rather, scholars tend to focus on fair use.  Courts have 
considered this question very rarely and also tend to concentrate on fair 
use.  Because these cases rarely progress to decisions, there is little to be 
said of what courts have done but much to be said of what they ought 
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to.  This Article engages in a thought experiment of laying out the legal 
analysis in the case that will never be—NBC v. Romney—arguing that 
when copyrighted content is marshaled to advance a political message, 
copyright ought to yield to the First Amendment. 
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“Men speak of freedom of belief and freedom of property as if, in 
the Constitution, the word ‘freedom,’ as used in these two cases, had the 
same meaning.  Because of that confusion, we are in constant danger of 
giving to a man’s possessions the same dignity, the same status, as we 
give to the man himself.”1 
“First Amendment protections [are] embodied in the Copyright 
Act’s distinction between copyrightable expression and uncopyrightable 
facts and ideas, and the latitude for scholarship and comment 
traditionally afforded by fair use . . . .”2 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Consider the following scenario: In connection with a campaign 
for office, a politician airs an advertisement that uses a song.  
Someone objects by way of a cease-and-desist letter, threatening to sue 
the campaign.  The campaign removes the advertisement from the 
airwaves or ceases using the song. 
Initially, this may seem like an unlikely scenario.  After all, the 
First Amendment implications of political speech and discussions of 
political issues seem obvious.3  Nonetheless, similar scenarios have 
played out in many political campaigns at all levels of government.4  
One candidate for office even used the copyright in her website posts 
to compel an opposing candidate to stop using her own words against 
her.5  When First Amendment and copyright issues collide in the 
 
 1.  ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM: THE CONSTITUTIONAL POWERS OF 
THE PEOPLE 9 (1948). 
 2.  Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 560 (1985). 
 3.  See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 14 (1976). 
 4.  See, e.g., Jack Doyle, I’m a Dole Man, 1996, THE POP HISTORY DIG (Dec. 3, 2009), 
http://www.pophistorydig.com/?p=4891 (describing Bob Dole’s use of a version of “Soul Man” in 
his 1996 presidential election campaign and the ensuing allegations of infringement); Jack 
Doyle, I Won’t Back Down, 1989–2008, THE POP HISTORY DIG (Mar. 7, 2009), 
http://www.pophistorydig.com/?p=932 (describing George W. Bush’s use of Tom Petty’s “I Won’t 
Back Down” and Petty’s objections to same); Gary Graff, David Byrne Sues Florida Gov. Charlie 
Crist for $1 Million, BILLBOARD (May 24, 2010, 2:31 PM), http://www.billboard.com/news/david-
byrne-sues-florida-gov-charlie-crist-1004093436.story#/news/david-byrne-sues-florida-gov-
charlie-crist-1004093436.story (describing copyright infringement lawsuit against Charlie Crist 
for using the song “Road to Nowhere” in an ad during his campaign for Senate); Martin Lewis, 
Chris Christie Rips off Monty Python, Troupe Threatens Suit, HUFF POST NEW YORK: THE BLOG  
(Nov. 1, 2009, 6:17 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/martin-lewis/chris-christie-rips-off-
m_b_341598.html (describing accusations of copyright infringement against Chris Christie for 
use of a Monty Python sketch in an ad during his campaign for Governor of New Jersey in 2010).  
 5.  See Eric Kleefeld, Angle Sends Cease-and-Desist to Reid -- For Reposting Her Own 
Website, TALKING POINTS MEMO (July 5, 2010, 2:52 PM), http://talkingpointsmemo.com/dc/angle-
sends-cease-and-desist-to-reid-for-reposting-her-own-website. 
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context of campaign politics, high stakes and short timelines make 
even untenable challenges possible. 
During the Republican primary campaign leading up to the 
2012 presidential election, copyright owners objected to the use of 
content in at least seven different instances.6  The majority of these 
objections concerned the use of sound recordings at campaign events.7  
But one—the scenario that will be the focus of this Article—concerned 
the use of a news report in a campaign ad.8  This Article focuses on the 
use of news footage rather than songs because an ASCAP or BMI 
license usually covers the songs used on the campaign trail.9  
Therefore, protestations to the contrary notwithstanding, such uses 
seldom implicate viable copyright infringement claims.  Rather, artists 
rely on the Lanham Act and the right of publicity to assert that use of 
their songs at campaign events falsely implies some relationship 
between the artist and the politician or the political message.10  
Therefore, in order to address the copyright issues, this Article focuses 
on a situation in which copyright was front and center—the dispute 
between Mitt Romney and the National Broadcasting Company (NBC) 
concerning the use of certain news footage.11 
 
 6.  See Katie Byrne, K’Naan Wants Mitt Romney to Stop Using Waving Flag, MTV 
(Feb. 1, 2012, 7:50 PM), http://www.mtv.com/news/articles/1678368/knaan-mitt-romney-waving-
flag.jhtml (“Waving Flag”); Miriam Coleman, Newt Gingrich Ordered to Stop Using ‘How You 
Like Me Now?’, ROLLING STONE (Jan. 28, 2012, 1:30 PM), 
http://www.rollingstone.com/music/news/newt-gingrich-ordered-to-stop-using-how-you-like-me-
now-20120128 (“How You Like Me Now?”); Andy Greene, Katrina and the Waves Join Tom 
Petty’s Fight Against Michele Bachmann, ROLLING STONE (June 29, 2011, 3:50 PM), 
http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/news/katrina-and-the-waves-join-tom-pettys-fight-against-
michele-bachmann-20110629 ( “Walking on Sunshine”); Alleged Copyright Infringement and 
Newt Gingrich: What’s All the Fuss?, DICKINSON LAW: IOWA INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY BLOG (Feb. 
1, 2012), http://www.dickinsonlaw.com/2012/02/allegedcopyright-infringement-and-newt- 
gingrich-whats-all-the-fuss (“Eye of the Tiger”); Silversun Pickups Tell Romney to Stop Using 
‘Panic Switch’, ROLLING STONE MUSIC (Aug. 16, 2012, 9:50 AM), 
http://www.rollingstone.com/music/news/silversun-pickups-tells-romney-to-stop-using-panic-
switch-20120816 (“Panic Switch”); Tom Petty to Michele Bachmann: Stop Playing ‘American 
Girl’, HUFFINGTON POST (June 28, 2011, 7:15 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ 
2011/06/28/tom-petty-michele-bachmann_n_886384.html (“American Girl”). 
 7.  See sources cited supra note 6. 
 8.  See Tierney Sneed, Should Mitt Romney Withdraw His Tom Brokaw Ad?, U.S. 
NEWS (Jan. 30, 2012),   http://www.usnews.com/opinion/articles/2012/01/30/should-mitt-romney-
withdraw-his-tom-brokaw-ad. 
 9.  See Meredith Filak, Campaigns, Copyrights, and Compositions: A Politician's Guide 
to Music on the Campaign Trail, PUBLIC KNOWLEDGE (July 6, 2011, updated July 7, 2011), 
http://publicknowledge.org/blog/campaigns-copyrights-and-compositions-politic. 
 10. See generally Sarah Schacter, Note, The Barracuda Lacuna: Music, Political 
Campaigns, and the First Amendment, 99 GEO. L.J. 571, 587–97 (2011) (discussing the 
endorsement aspects of a claim based on the use of music on the campaign trail). 
 11.  See infra notes 18–24 and accompanying text. 
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In the middle of the fight of his life, his bid for the 2012 
Republican presidential nomination, Mitt Romney ended up entangled 
in a very different fight—the long-standing battle between copyright 
and the First Amendment.12  Romney was not the only candidate 
waging this two-front war; both Newt Gingrich and Michele 
Bachmann also faced claims of copyright infringement.13  In fact, 
while Romney14 and Bachmann capitulated to the demands that they 
cease using certain copyrighted content,15 Gingrich was ultimately 
sued.16  Like most suits that arise in this context, the Gingrich matter 
settled quickly.17  The dispute between Romney and NBC provides an 
interesting point of departure for a thought experiment about what 
might happen if a court actually decided such a copyright 
infringement suit on its merits. 
On Friday, January 27, 2012, four days before the Republican 
primary in Florida, the Romney campaign began running an ad there 
entitled “History Lesson.”18  The thirty-second ad consisted solely of a 
snippet of an NBC Nightly News report that originally aired on 
January 21, 1997.19  The snippet in the ad showed Tom Brokaw 
reporting on the end of Newt Gingrich’s career in the US House of 
Representatives.  Brokaw said: 
Good evening. Newt Gingrich, who came to power, after all, preaching a higher standard 
in American politics; a man who brought down another Speaker on ethics  
accusations—tonight he has on his own record the judgment of his peers, Democrat and 
Republican alike. By an overwhelming vote, they found him guilty of ethics violations; 
they charged him a very large financial penalty; and they raised, several of them, raised 
serious questions about his future effectiveness.20 
 
 12.  See generally Joseph P. Bauer, Copyright and the First Amendment: Comrades, 
Combatants, or Uneasy Allies?, 67 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 831 (2010) (describing the conflict 
between the copyright regime and First Amendment principles). 
 13.  See sources cited supra note 6. 
 14.  See James C. McKinley, Jr., G.O.P. Candidates Are Told, Don’t Use the Verses, It’s 
Not Your Song, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 3, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/04/arts/music/romney-
and-gingrich-pull-songs-after-complaints.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0. 
 15.  See id. 
 16.  See Complaint, Rude Music, Inc. v. Newt 2012 Inc., No. 1:12-cv-00640 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 
23, 2012). 
 17.  See Joy Lin, Gingrich Settling ‘Eye of the Tiger’ Lawsuit, FOXNEWS.COM POLITICS 
BLOG (Aug. 24, 2012), http://politics.blogs.foxnews.com/2012/08/24/gingrich-settling-eye-tiger-
lawsuit. 
 18.  See Daily Mail Reporter, NBC Asks Romney to Stop Running Tom Brokaw Ad 
Which Undermines Networks ‘Journalistic Credibility’, MAIL ONLINE (Jan. 28, 2012 11:34 PM), 
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2093324/NBC-asks-Romney-stop-running-Tom-Brokaw-
ad-undermines-networks-journalistic-credibility.html [hereinafter NBC Asks Romney] (including 
embedded video of the ad). 
 19.  See id. 
 20.  Id. (transcription of video ad). 
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On Saturday, January 28, NBC voiced its objection to the 
advertisement in a cease-and-desist letter claiming, among other 
things, copyright infringement.21  Later that day, the campaign 
claimed that its use of the content constituted fair use.22  Romney 
himself responded to NBC’s claims on Monday, January 30, saying 
that the campaign intended to discuss the matter with NBC’s 
lawyers.23  Ultimately, the campaign withdrew the ad and removed it 
from the campaign website.24 
Such capitulation is the rule rather than the exception.25  As a 
result, there is very little relevant case law considering the merits of 
such cases.26  In lieu thereof, this Article considers how such a case 
might be—and how it ought to be—resolved judicially. 
All of the commentary occurring at the time “History Lesson” 
aired concerned whether the Romney campaign’s use of the footage 
constituted fair use under the Copyright Act.27  At first blush, this 
may seem odd.  After all, the First Amendment affords speech within 
the context of a political campaign the highest degree of protection.28  
However, given the United States Supreme Court’s prior treatment of 
First Amendment assertions in the context of copyright suits,29 relying 
upon the fair use doctrine makes sense.30  This Article asks whether 
courts should reconsider the need for First Amendment scrutiny in 
 
 21.  See id.; see also Dylan Byers, NBC’s Letter to the Romney Campaign, POLITICO (Jan. 
28, 2012, 4:02 PM), http://www.politico.com/blogs/media/2012/01/nbcs-letter-to-the-romney-
campaign-112662.html (reproducing the letter). 
 22.  See NBC Asks Romney, supra note 18. 
 23.  See Michael Inbar, Romney: We’ll Meet With NBC About Brokaw Clip in Ad,  
TODAY NEWS (Jan. 30, 2012, 9:26 AM), http://www.today.com/id/46188734/ns/today-
today_news/t/romney-well-meet-nbc-about-brokaw-clip-ad/#.UT1q5tY3zdd. 
 24.  See Margaret Hartmann, Journalists Unhappy About Unauthorized Romney Ad 
Cameo, N.Y. MAG., http://nymag.com/daily/intelligencer/2012/07/journalists-unhappy-about-
romney-ad-cameo.html (July 15, 2012, 11:37 PM). 
 25.  See Eriq Gardner, Michele Bahmann in Legal Spat for Using Tom Petty’s ‘American 
Girl’ at Rally, THE HOLLYWOOD REPORTER: HOLLYWOOD, ESQ. (June 28, 2011, 11:48 AM), 
http://www.hollywoodreporter.com/thr-esq/michele-bachmann-legal-spat-using-206257 (listing 
copyright disputes in the context of political campaigns and noting instances of capitulation). 
 26.  In fact, only six decisions considering allegations of copyright infringement in the 
context of a political campaign can be found. See infra Part IV. 
 27.  See, e.g., Ken Paulson, Copyright Law Favors Romney in Ad’s Use of NBC News 
Report, FIRST AMENDMENT CTR. (Jan. 30, 2012), http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/copyright-
law-favors-romney-in-ads-use-of-nbc-news-report; see also Ted Johnson, Fair Use? NBC Asks 
Romney Campaign to Stop Using Footage in Ad, VARIETY (Jan. 28, 2012, 2:28 PM), 
http://variety.com/2012/biz/opinion/fair-use-nbc-news-asks-romney-campaign-to-stop-using-
footage-in-ad-36896. 
 28.  See infra Part III.B.  
 29.  See infra notes 49–61 and accompanying text. 
 30.  See infra notes 49–61 and accompanying text. 
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copyright infringement suits,31 at least in the limited context where 
the alleged infringement takes place in the context of a political 
campaign.  In other words, can authors of copyrighted content grant or 
refuse licenses to political campaigns based solely upon their own 
ideological perspectives?  If we believe that political discourse would 
suffer if Fox News’s content is only available for Republicans and 
MSNBC’s content is only available to Democrats, then the application 
of First Amendment principles in this context must become more 
robust. 
The Article proceeds to imagine a judicial resolution to the 
dispute between Mitt Romney and NBC.  The intent of this exercise is 
to provide an example illustrating the tension between copyright and 
the First Amendment.  Most courts have either ducked this tension or 
held in favor of copyright interests.32  This Article demonstrates the 
need for a more vigorous consideration of First Amendment principles 
in these circumstances.  Part II reviews the jurisprudence addressing 
First Amendment claims in the copyright context.  Part III considers 
how the conflict between NBC and the Romney campaign might have 
been resolved if approached from the perspective of the First 
Amendment.  Part IV presents an imagined resolution of the conflict if 
approached from the perspective of copyright infringement and 
considers whether the First Amendment interests at issue in such a 
dispute are truly protected by the fair use defense and idea-expression 
dichotomy.  Ultimately, the Article concludes that—at least where the 
alleged infringement occurs in the context of a political campaign—the 
safeguards internal to the Copyright Act, as currently deployed, do not 
fully protect the First Amendment interests at stake.  Part V 
endeavors to reconcile the Copyright Act with the First Amendment in 
this context. 
II. THE COPYRIGHT ACT–FIRST AMENDMENT INTERFACE: CAN THE 
FIRST AMENDMENT BE CREDIBLY ASSERTED IN A COPYRIGHT 
INFRINGEMENT CASE? 
“Concerning the First Amendment . . . some restriction on 
expression is the inherent and intended effect of every grant of 
copyright.”33  Scores of scholars have considered the potential conflict 
 
 31.  For another recent treatment of this topic, see Patrick Cronin, The Historical 
Origins of the Conflict Between Copyright and the First Amendment, 35 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 221 
(2012). 
 32.  See infra notes 68–70 and accompanying text. 
 33.  Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873, 889 (2012). 
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between the Copyright Act and the First Amendment.34  This 
scholarly interest began in 1970 with seminal articles by Melville 
Nimmer35 and Paul Goldstein.36  Nimmer argued that what he 
referred to as the “definitional balance” achieved by the  
idea-expression dichotomy largely mitigated the apparent conflict.37  
Goldstein, tracing American copyright to its censorial roots,38 
perceived a broader conflict and asserted the need for accommodation 
principles taking into account the public interest39—a tack specifically 
rejected by Nimmer.40  While Nimmer recognized some limited 
instances in which the idea-expression dichotomy did not mitigate the 
conflict between the First Amendment and the Copyright Act,41 the 
accommodations he suggested were significantly more limited than 
those suggested by Goldstein.42  This is hardly surprising given 
Goldstein and Nimmer’s differing perceptions as to the breadth of the 
conflict. 
Courts that have considered conflicts between the First 
Amendment and the Copyright Act have generally held that both the 
idea-expression dichotomy and fair use operate to check any perceived 
conflict.43  However, the vast majority of scholars, building on Nimmer 
and Goldstein’s foundations, have argued that these internal 
 
 34.  See generally DAVID L. LANGE & H. JEFFERSON POWELL, NO LAW: INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY IN THE IMAGE OF AN ABSOLUTE FIRST AMENDMENT (2009); NEIL WEINSTOCK NETANEL, 
COPYRIGHT’S PARADOX (2008); Yochai Benkler, Free as the Air to Common Use: First Amendment 
Constraints on Enclosure of the Public Domain, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 354 (1999); Lawrence Lessig, 
Lecture, Copyright's First Amendment, 48 UCLA L. REV. 1057 (2001); Adrian Liu, Copyright as 
Quasi-Public Property: Reinterpreting the Conflict Between Copyright and the First Amendment, 
18 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 383 (2008); Neil Weinstock Netanel, Locating 
Copyright Within the First Amendment Skein, 54 STAN. L. REV. 1 (2001); Rebecca Tushnet, Copy 
this Essay: How Fair Use Doctrine Harms Free Speech and How Copying Serves It, 114 YALE L.J. 
535, 546 (2004); Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Intellectual Property: Some Thoughts 
After Eldred, 44 Liquormart, and Bartnicki, 40 HOUS. L. REV. 697 (2003). 
 35.  Melville B. Nimmer, Does Copyright Abridge the First Amendment Guarantees of 
Free Speech and the Press?, 17 UCLA L. REV. 1180 (1970). 
 36.  Paul Goldstein, Copyright and the First Amendment, 70 COLUM. L. REV. 983 (1970).  
 37.  Nimmer, supra note 35, at 1189–93. 
 38.  Goldstein, supra note 36, at 983. 
 39.  Id. at 988. 
 40.  Nimmer, supra note 35, at 1199. 
 41.  Id. at 1193–1200. Notably, one such instance perceived by Nimmer as problematic 
was the use of news photographs. Id. at 1199. Nimmer defines news photographs as “all products 
of the photographic and analogous processes, including motion picture film and video tape . . . if 
the event depicted in the photograph, as distinguished from the fact that the photograph was 
made, is the subject of news stories appearing in newspapers throughout the country.” Id. This 
would appear to place all photographs and broadcasts of news carriers outside of the purview of 
copyright. However, cases decided since Nimmer’s article make it clear that such is not the case. 
See infra notes 156–161 and accompanying text. 
 42.  Nimmer, supra note 35, at 1200. 
 43.  See infra note 145 and accompanying text. 
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mechanisms are insufficient to protect the inherent free speech 
concerns; therefore, the Copyright Act ought to be subject to First 
Amendment scrutiny.44  For example, one scholar recently argued 
that, where the derivative works right is at issue, the Copyright Act is 
susceptible to a First Amendment challenge based upon overbreadth 
and vagueness.45  Another has asserted that the First Amendment 
cannot aid in resolving copyright disputes because there are First 
Amendment values on both sides in any copyright infringement suit.46 
This Article seeks to bring some of these theoretical forays 
down to earth.  It reflects upon a situation in which a political 
campaign used copyrighted content without obtaining the copyright 
owner’s permission.  Although such disputes arise every campaign 
season, because the campaigns (the alleged infringers) tend to concede 
to the demands of copyright owners, commentators are unlikely to 
have definitive case law upon which to rely any time soon.47  This 
Article attempts to fill the void left in the absence of such cases and, in 
so doing, to demonstrate that the current approach to these issues 
results in chilling important political speech. 
In a sense, it is not at all surprising that the Romney campaign 
ceased running the “History Lesson” ad in the face of NBC’s 
objections.  NBC’s cease-and-desist letter came a mere ten days after 
the Supreme Court’s decision in Golan v. Holder.48  The Golan Court 
held that the Uruguay Round Agreement Act,49 which restored 
copyright protection to various works of foreign authors, did not 
require heightened First Amendment scrutiny.50  In so holding, the 
Court merely extended the approach it took in Eldred v. Ashcroft in 
which it considered whether the Copyright Term Extension Act51 
(CTEA) ran afoul of the First Amendment.52  The CTEA extended the 
term of all existing copyrights by twenty years,53 and the Court held 
that no heightened First Amendment scrutiny was required because 
 
 44.  See, e.g., Jed Rubenfeld, The Freedom of Imagination: Copyright's Constitutionality, 
112 YALE L.J. 1 (2002). 
 45.  Christina Bohannan, Taming the Derivative Works Right: A Modest Proposal for 
Reducing Overbreadth and Vagueness in Copyright, 12 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH L. 669 (2010). 
 46.  David McGowan, Why the First Amendment Cannot Dictate Copyright Policy, 65 U. 
PITT. L. REV. 281 (2004). 
 47.  See infra Part IV. 
 48.  Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873 (2012). 
 49.  Codified at 17 U.S.C. § 104A. 
 50.  See Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 878. 
 51.  Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, Pub. L. No. 105-298, 112 Stat. 2827 
(1998). 
 52.  See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 218–21 (2003). 
 53.  Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act § 102. 
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the law did not affect “the traditional contours of copyright.”54  The 
Golan Court later defined the term “traditional contours” of copyright 
as limited to the idea-expression dichotomy and the affirmative 
defense of fair use.55  In both Golan and Eldred, the Court rejected 
facial First Amendment challenges to Copyright Act revisions.56  One 
potential area for First Amendment consideration, then, may be an  
as-applied challenge. 
The last time the Court considered an as-applied First 
Amendment challenge to the Copyright Act was Harper & Row 
Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises.57 In Harper & Row, Nation 
Enterprises answered Harper & Row’s copyright infringement claim 
by asserting that its use of President Ford’s memoir was privileged 
under the First Amendment.58  Specifically, Nation Enterprises 
argued that the freedom of press guaranteed by the First Amendment 
protected its use of the newsworthy content.59  Rejecting this 
argument, the Court stated: “In our haste to disseminate news it 
should not be forgotten that the Framers intended copyright itself to 
be the engine of free expression. By establishing a marketable right to 
the use of one’s expression, copyright supplies the economic incentive 
to create and disseminate ideas.”60 
In the wake of Harper & Row, lower courts have consistently 
rejected the First Amendment as a defense to a copyright 
infringement claim.61  Although the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Eleventh Circuit issued a decision finding that that the 
issuance of an injunction in a copyright infringement suit constituted 
a prior restraint in violation of the First Amendment,62 the court 
ultimately vacated its decision, replacing it with one  focused on the 
fair use defense.63  While there are no decisions directly addressing 
the issue of whether the use of copyrighted content in the context of a 
 
 54.  Eldred, 537 U.S. at 221. 
 55.  Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 890. 
 56.  See id. at 878; Eldred, 537 U.S. at 218. 
 57.  Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 541–42 (1985). 
 58.  See id. at 555 (“Respondents, however, contend that First Amendment values 
require a different rule under the circumstances of this case.”). 
 59.  See Brief for Respondents at 43, Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 
471 U.S. 539 (1985) (No. 83-1632), 1984 WL 565761, at *43. 
 60.  Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 558. 
 61.  See, e.g., Fisher v. Dees, 794 F.2d 432, 435 (9th Cir. 1982); Universal City Studios, 
Inc. v. Reimerdes, 82 F. Supp. 2d 211, 220 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (“[T]he First Amendment does not 
shield copyright infringement.”); Chi. Sch. Reform Bd, of Trs. v. Substance, Inc., 79 F. Supp. 2d 
919, 925 (N.D. Ill. 2000); Lish v. Harper’s Magazine Found., 807 F. Supp. 1090, 1105 (S.D.N.Y. 
1992). 
 62.  See SunTrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 252 F.3d 1165, 1166 (11th Cir.), 
vacated by 268 F.3d 1257 (2001). 
 63.  See SunTrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1276 (11th Cir. 2001). 
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political campaign is protected by the First Amendment, the 
hesitation of courts to consider First Amendment arguments in the 
context of copyright infringement suits would counsel litigants to 
proceed on the basis of fair use.  In fact, all of the decisions about 
copyright infringement in the context of political campaigns progress 
along these lines.64 
It is important to note that defendants in copyright 
infringement suits face steep consequences.  A finding of copyright 
infringement can result in the issuance of an injunction65 and the 
imposition of statutory damages that may far exceed any actual 
damages suffered by the copyright owner.66  Courts have avoided 
considering a First Amendment defense in the copyright infringement 
context by applying the Supreme Court’s holding in eBay v. 
MercExchange,67 which requires an equitable four-factor analysis to 
determine whether the issuance of an injunction is appropriate.68  
Prior to eBay, once a copyright holder demonstrated infringement, 
courts presumed the likelihood of irreparable harm and, therefore, the 
issuance of injunctive relief was generally a foregone conclusion.69  It 
has been suggested that refusing to enjoin copyright infringement in 
some instances will serve to protect First Amendment interests.70 
While applying eBay to make the issuance of injunctive relief 
less likely may help alleviate some First Amendment concerns, merely 
focusing on injunctive relief cannot fully address those concerns when 
the specter of damages of up to $150,000 per infringement looms.  In 
addition, the Copyright Act provides that the prevailing party may 
also recover attorney’s fees and costs.71  This Article asserts that when 
the alleged infringement occurs in the context of a political campaign, 
the freedom of speech interests are so acute that resorting to the fair 
use doctrine or the idea-expression dichotomy is insufficient.  Rather, 
courts should either approach the question from the First Amendment 
perspective or, at the very least, better incorporate First Amendment 
principles into the fair use analysis. 
This Article will now consider the hypothetical case NBC v. 
Romney from the perspective of the First Amendment followed by an 
analysis under the Copyright Act.  This side-by-side analysis calls into 
 
 64.  See infra notes 184–194, 214–223 and accompanying text. 
 65.  See 17 U.S.C. § 502 (2012). 
 66.  See id. § 504. 
 67.  See eBay v. MercExchange, 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006). 
 68.  See Salinger v. Colting, 607 F.3d 68, 79 (2d Cir. 2010). 
 69.  See, e.g., id. at 75–76 (explaining the Second Circuit’s approach prior to eBay). 
 70.  See Mark A. Lemley and Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Injunctions in 
Intellectual Property Cases, 48 DUKE L.J. 147, 182 (1998). 
 71.  17 U.S.C. § 505 (2012). 
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question the assertion that Copyright’s internal safeguards—namely, 
the idea-expression dichotomy and the affirmative defense of fair  
use—are sufficient to protect First Amendment interests. 
III. CONSIDERING NBC V. ROMNEY FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF THE 
FIRST AMENDMENT 
As the Court made clear, “political speech [is] at the core of 
what the First Amendment is designed to protect.”72  Before 
undertaking the substantive analysis of the fictional suit between 
Romney and NBC, it is important to note some points of First 
Amendment law.  As an initial matter, the fact that the suit in 
question would occur between private litigants does not preclude First 
Amendment analysis.73  While there must be some state action in 
order for the First Amendment to apply,74 the enforcement of the 
Copyright Act constitutes such state action.75  Courts have entertained 
First Amendment arguments in defamation cases,76 right of publicity 
cases,77 and trademark cases.78  Moreover, in copyright cases that 
raised First Amendment arguments, no court refused to hear such 
arguments because of a lack of state action.79 
Further, any assertion that the nature of copyright, being a 
private property interest, precludes First Amendment inquiry is 
untenable.  First, the idea that copyright is, in fact, property is very 
much in dispute.80  Moreover, First Amendment jurisprudence 
provides any number of instances in which the asserted property 
 
 72.  Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 365 (2003). 
 73.  See The N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 265 (1964).  
 74.  See id. at 265. 
 75.  See id. (“Although this is a civil lawsuit between private parties, the Alabama courts 
have applied a state rule of law which petitioners claim to impose invalid restrictions on their 
constitutional freedoms of speech and press. It matters not that that law has been applied in a 
civil action and that it is common law only, though supplemented by statute. . . . The test is not 
the form in which state power has been applied but, whatever the form, whether such power has 
in fact been exercised.” (internal citations omitted)).  
 76.  See id. at 266. 
 77.  See, e.g., Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460, 462 (9th Cir. 1988). 
 78.  See, e.g., S.F. Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. U.S. Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522, 535 
(1987).  
 79.  See supra notes 49–65 and accompanying text. 
 80.  See WILLIAM PATRY, MORAL PANICS AND THE COPYRIGHT WARS 109–20 (2009) 
(explaining that the main difference between tangible property and copyrights arises from ex 
ante physical limitations on rights in the former and expansive, abstract ex post rights in the 
latter). 
2014] “WHAT HE SAID.” 509 
interests of one party necessarily cede to the First Amendment rights 
of another.81 
Having addressed these preliminary matters, this Article turns 
now to a consideration of whether the Romney campaign’s use of the 
content in question ought to be privileged under the First 
Amendment. 
A. The Copyright Act, as Applied to the Use of Content in the Context of 
Political Campaigns, is Arguably Unconstitutionally Vague 
Some scholars have recently noted that the Copyright Act may 
be unconstitutionally vague.82  While one vein of this scholarship is 
limited to “the broad swath of copyright law in which the derivative 
works right intersects with the fair use doctrine,”83 the other sets out a 
general vagueness problem in the Copyright Act.84  That said, both 
recognize the problematically vague nature of the fair use defense,85 
and both agree that it is unlikely that a court will find the Copyright 
Act, as a whole, void for vagueness.86 
A statute is unconstitutionally vague when “men of common 
intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its 
application.”87  A vague statute may run afoul of the First Amendment 
if it prohibits protected expression.88  In addition, reliance upon an 
affirmative defense to rescue an unconstitutional statute is 
necessarily problematic under the First Amendment.89 
Political speech is not only protected expression; it receives the 
maximum protection under the First Amendment.90  While some 
courts have held that the First Amendment does not give an 
individual the right to copy another’s speech,91 no court has yet 
considered the potential vagueness of the fair use defense as it applies 
to the use of copyrighted content in the context of a campaign for 
 
 81.  See, e.g., Louis Michael Seidman, The Dale Problem: Property and Speech Under 
the Regulatory State, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 1541, 1548 (2008) (collecting and analyzing cases). 
 82.  See Bradley E. Abruzzi, Copyright and the Vagueness Doctrine, 45 U. MICH. J.L. 
REFORM 351, 366 (2012); Bohannan, supra note 45, at 683. 
 83.  Bohannan, supra note 45, at 672. 
 84.  See Abruzzi, supra note 82, at 372. 
 85.  See Bohannan, supra note 45, at 681–88; Abruzzi, supra note 82, at 377–81. 
 86.  See Bohannan, supra note 45, at 692–94; Abruzzi, supra note 82, at 387. 
 87.  Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926) (citing Int’l Harvester Co. 
v. Kentucky, 234 U.S. 216, 221 (1914); Collins v. Kentucky, 234 U.S. 634, 638 (1914)). 
 88.  See, e.g., Winters v. New York, 33 U.S. 507, 509 (1948). 
 89.  See Bohannan, supra note 45, at 681–82. 
 90.   See supra notes 76–89 and accompanying text; infra notes 96–105 and 
accompanying text. 
 91.  See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 221 (2003). 
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political office.  Examining the dispute between Romney and NBC 
may provide a road map for a litigant advancing a vagueness 
argument in this context. 
As noted previously, all of the contemporaneous commentary 
about the Romney-NBC dispute concerned application of the fair use 
doctrine.92  While many commentators saw a clear case for fair use,93 
one expert opined that Romney’s fair use argument was anything but 
clear.94  This demonstrates that even the experts disagree over the 
application of the fair use doctrine in this context.  Moreover, it is 
clear that Romney’s advertisement is “speech uttered during a 
campaign for political office” and, as such, is entitled to the highest 
degree of protection under the First Amendment.95  Further 
consideration of the jurisprudence laying out the protection afforded 
campaign speech demonstrates that requiring Romney to engage in 
the fact-intensive project of proving that his use is a permissible fair 
use would run afoul of the First Amendment. 
B. Campaign Speech Has Long Enjoyed Special Protection Under the 
First Amendment 
The Supreme Court has long held that the First Amendment 
provides the greatest protection to speech concerning governmental 
affairs.96  In fact, in Eu v. San Francisco County Democratic Central  
Committee, the Court stated: “[T]he First Amendment ‘has its fullest 
and most urgent application’ to speech uttered during a campaign for 
political office.”97  Such speech is deemed necessary for  
self-government.98  According to the Court, “debate on the 
 
 92.  See supra note 27 and accompanying text. 
 93.  See e.g., Paulson, supra note 27; Seth Abramovitch, Is Romney's Tom Brokaw Ad 
‘Fair Use?’, THE WIRE (Jan. 29, 2012, 10:00 AM), http://www.thewire.com/ 
politics/2012/01/romney-nbc-ad-fair-use/48013. 
 94.  See Geri Haight, Copyright Lessons from the Campaign Trail: Romney, Gingrich 
and Fair Use, MINTZ LEVIN: COPYRIGHT & TRADEMARK MATTERS (Jan. 30, 2012), 
http://www.copyrighttrademarkmatters.com/2012/01/30/copyright-lessons-from-the-campaign-
trail-romney-and-fair-use. 
 95.  See William A. Williams, A Necessary Compromise: Protecting Electoral Integrity 
Through the Regulation of False Campaign Speech, 52 S.D. L. REV. 321, 349 (2007); infra notes 
96–105 and accompanying text. 
 96.  See Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966) (“[T]here is practically universal 
agreement that a major purpose of . . . [the First] Amendment was to protect the free discussion 
of governmental affairs.”).  
 97.  Eu v. S.F. Cnty. Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 223 (1989) (quoting 
Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 272 (1971)). 
 98.  Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 160 (1983) (“‘[S]peech concerning public affairs is 
more than self-expression; it is the essence of self-government.’” (quoting Garrison v. Louisiana, 
379 U.S. 64, 74–75 (1965)) (alteration in original)). 
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qualifications of candidates [is] integral to the operation of the system 
of government established by our Constitution.”99  Courts consistently 
hold restrictions on advertisements concerning both political issues 
and candidates unconstitutional under strict scrutiny.100  The 
Supreme Court’s recent decision in Citizens United v. Federal Election 
Commission bears this out.101  In Citizens United, the Court 
specifically held that “political speech must prevail over law that 
would suppress it, whether by design or inadvertence.”102  Although 
Citizens United deals with a very different statute, much of the 
language of the decision is arguably directly applicable to suits arising 
under the Copyright Act.  For example: 
The First Amendment does not permit laws that force speakers to retain a[n] . . . 
attorney . . . or seek declaratory rulings before discussing the most salient political 
issues of our day. . . . The Government may not render a ban on political speech 
constitutional by carving out a limited exemption . . . .103 
The Citizens United Court “decline[d] to adopt an 
interpretation that require[d] intricate case-by-case determinations to 
verify whether political speech is banned.”104  The Court also pointed 
out that the very need for lawsuits commenced in the “heat of political 
campaigns” to determine whether certain speech is acceptable 
“stifle[s]” political speech.105 
The advertisement at issue in our fictional suit between NBC 
and Romney certainly concerns governmental affairs. It is speech 
concerning the qualifications of a candidate for public office.  As such, 
it ought to be accorded the highest degree of protection under the First 
Amendment.106  Under current case law, Romney’s best option for 
escaping liability in a copyright infringement action would be a 
successful assertion of the fair use defense.107 But, such an approach 
would necessitate a case-by-case determination.108  The Supreme 
 
 99.  Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 14 (1976). 
 100.  See, e.g., Fed. Election Comm’n, v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 464 (2007). 
 101.  See, e.g., Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n,, 558 U.S. 310, 340 (2010). 
 102.  Id. 
 103.  Id. at 324. 
 104.  Id. at 329. 
 105.  Id. at 334. 
 106.  See Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949) (“The vitality of civil and 
political institutions in our society depends on free discussion. As Chief Justice Hughes wrote in 
De Jonge v. Oregon, it is only through free debate and free exchange of ideas that government 
remains responsive to the will of the people and peaceful change is effected. The right to speak 
freely and to promote diversity of ideas and programs is therefore one of the chief distinctions 
that sets us apart from totalitarian regimes.” (internal citation omitted)).  
 107.  See Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 560 (1985). 
 108.  See COPYRIGHT LITIGATION HANDBOOK § 13:22 (2d ed. 2013) 
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Court in Citizens United specifically stated that requiring such 
determinations in the heat of a campaign is impermissible under the 
First Amendment.109  As such, it seems clear that if the fictional case 
NBC v. Romney were approached from the perspective of the First 
Amendment, NBC would be unable to obtain injunctive relief.110  This, 
of course, leaves open the question of whether NBC ought to be 
entitled to damages. 
C.  Allowing Any Remedy in these Circumstances Would Infringe the 
Constitutionally Protected Freedom to Listen 
Allegations of copyright infringement when the copyrighted 
content is used in the context of a political campaign not only 
implicate the First Amendment rights of the speaker but also offends 
those of the intended audience—the voting citizenry.  It has long been 
recognized that First Amendment protections extend to the right of all 
of us to hear the exchange of information.111  In other words, 
“[s]ociety’s interests in enjoying a transparent debate and in receiving 
information . . . are paramount and are protected in conjunction with 
the speaker’s interest in self-expression.”112  This right is particularly 
salient when the expression in dispute constitutes political speech.113  
The very notion of self-government requires an informed electorate.114 
Forcing a politician to pull an advertisement deprives the 
voting public of the politician’s intended message.  While some might 
argue that the Romney campaign could have simply recounted the 
facts stated in the NBC report, the question really is whether it ought 
to be required to do so.115  The value in reproducing the NBC content 
 
 109.  Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 333–34 (2010). 
 110.  See id.; Near v. State of Minnesota ex rel. Olson., 283 U.S. 697, 737 (1931) (holding 
that enjoining protected speech is prohibited under the First Amendment); see also Lemley & 
Volokh, supra note 70, at 205 (regarding the sufficiency of damages in copyright infringement 
cases). 
 111.  See, e.g., Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 102 (1940) (“The exigencies of the 
colonial period and the efforts to secure freedom from oppressive administration developed a 
broadened conception of these liberties as adequate to supply the public need for information and 
education with respect to the significant issues of the times.”); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 
564 (1969) (“It is now well established that the Constitution protects the right to receive 
information and ideas. ‘This freedom (of speech and press) . . . necessarily protects the right to 
receive . . . .’” (quoting Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 143 (1943))). 
 112.  Peter J. Ferrara & Carlos S. Ramirez, The Constitutional Freedom to Listen, 6 
LIBERTY U. L. REV 1, 5 (2011). 
 113.  See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 14 (1976). 
 114.  See id.; Ferrara & Ramirez, supra note 112, at 6–7. 
 115.  See Randy Picker, Politics, Copyright and the First-Amendment Commons, THE 
UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW SCHOOL FACULTY BLOG (Feb. 21, 2012, 9:07 PM), 
http://uchicagolaw.typepad.com/faculty/2012/02/politics-copyright-and-the-first-amendment-
commons.html. 
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is more than merely recounting the asserted facts.  The reproduction 
of the news report adds a stamp of objectivity to the facts.  If the 
Romney campaign can use the footage, the voting public receives both 
the facts and the information that a respected news agency reported 
those facts.  If news agencies as copyright owners can stop politicians 
from engaging in such uses, they can deprive voters of information 
relevant to the credibility and impact of statements.  The message of 
the Romney campaign as embodied in its use of NBC’s footage may be 
useful; indeed, respected news outlets reported on Gingrich’s ethics 
problems.  The Romney campaign would assert that those problems 
are relevant to voters’ consideration of Gingrich as a candidate.  The 
most salient means to convey the totality of that message is to 
reproduce the content of respected news agency.  Utilizing the First 
Amendment as the appropriate frame for this question allows 
consideration of the interests of listeners, the voting public, as well as 
the political speakers. 
Having considered the First Amendment arguments Romney 
might assert in a potential suit over his use of NBC’s footage, this 
analysis moves on to consider whether the First Amendment rights of 
NBC might be implicated. 
D.  Anticipating the First Amendment Offense: The Right Not to 
Speak, Compelled Speech, and Expressive Association 
Faced with a First Amendment defense to a copyright 
infringement suit, copyright owners have asserted a countervailing 
First Amendment interest in stopping the alleged infringement.116  
Succinctly, the argument is that a failure to enjoin the alleged 
infringement constitutes a usurpation of the copyright owner’s right 
not to speak.117  This line of argument has some basis in the case law.  
In Harper & Row, the Supreme Court considered whether The 
Nation’s use of short excerpts from the memoirs of President Ford to 
scoop an article constituted fair use.118  Concluding that the use was 
not a fair use, the Court stated, “[F]reedom of thought and expression 
‘includes both the right to speak freely and the right to refrain from 
 
 116.  See Salinger v. Colting, 607 F.3d 68, 72 (2d Cir. 2010). 
 117.  See Brief for Plaintiff-Appellee at 50, Salinger v. Colting, 607 F.3d 68 (2d Cir. 2010) 
(No. 09-2878-cv), 2009 WL 6865323, at *50 (“Salinger’s constitutionally based right not to 
publish derivatives is not the type of injury that can adequately be remedied by monetary 
damages; it is exactly the kind of damage that courts traditionally find irreparable. Indeed, this 
Court has reversed a lower court for failing to issue a preliminary injunction in a case involving 
the right not to speak, citing the many cases to that effect.” (citing Int’l Dairy Foods Ass’n v. 
Amestoy, 92 F.3d 67, 71 (2d Cir. 1996))). 
 118.  See Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 560–69 (1985). 
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speaking at all.’”119  For this proposition, the Court relied upon Wooley 
v. Maynard, in which a New Hampshire statute requiring the display 
of the state motto “Live Free or Die” was held to infringe upon 
Maynard’s right not to speak.120  In Harper & Row the Court went on 
to say, “Courts and commentators have recognized that copyright, and 
the right of first publication in particular, serve this countervailing 
First Amendment value.”121 
More recently, in Salinger v. Colting the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Second Circuit stated, “The plaintiff’s interest is, 
principally, a property interest in the copyrighted material . . . 
[b]ut . . . a copyright holder might also have a First Amendment 
interest in not speaking.”122  Salinger dealt with whether the trial 
court erred in issuing an injunction against the publication of 60 Years 
Later: Coming Through the Rye, a novel by Frederik Colting.123  
Colting’s novel purported to tell the story of J.D. Salinger’s famous 
character, Holden Caulfield, sixty years after the events that occurred 
in The Catcher in the Rye.124 The Second Circuit considered whether 
the Plaintiff’s right not to speak might be implicated where the 
Defendant wrote an allegedly infringing sequel to the Plaintiff’s 
copyrighted work.  The allegedly infringing work did not copy 
Salinger’s novel.  Rather, Salinger alleged that Colting’s novel 
constituted an unauthorized sequel to The Catcher in the Rye.125  The 
plaintiffs asserted that publication of Colting’s novel would cause 
irreparable harm by infringing upon their right not to speak.126  
Although the Second Circuit remanded the case for consideration of 
the issue of irreparable harm, the Court explained that “infringement 
of the right not to speak, ‘for even minimal periods of time, 
unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury.’”127 
Although Harper & Row and Salinger relied nearly exclusively 
on Wooley as the conceptual basis for a copyright owner’s First 
Amendment right, Wooley is in a line of Supreme Court precedent that 
requires some exegesis to fully understand the ill-fit of the right not to 
speak and related concepts in the context of copyright infringement 
 
 119.  Id. at 559 (quoting Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714 (1977)). 
 120.  See 430 U.S. at 717. 
 121.  Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 560 (citing Schnapper v. Foley, 667 F.2d 102 (1981)). 
 122.  Salinger v. Colting, 607 F.3d 68, 81 (2d Cir. 2010) (citing Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. 
(8 Pet.) 591, 661 (1834); Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 559 
(1985)). 
 123.  Salinger, 607 F.3d at 74–75. 
 124.  Id. at 71. 
 125.  See id. at 72. 
 126.  See id. at 81. 
 127.  Id. (quoting Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 373 (1976)). 
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suits.128  The Court has broadly described the right not to speak: 
“[G]overnment may not force individuals to utter or convey messages 
they disagree with or, indeed, to say anything at all.”129  This right is 
said to be protective of “a speaker[’s] . . . autonomy to choose the 
content of his own message.”130 
The right not to speak is broad enough to prohibit the 
government from requiring an individual to convey the government’s 
message and from requiring an individual to convey a third party’s 
message.131  Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. Public Utilities Commission 
of California demonstrated the latter.  The Court held that an order of 
the California Public Utilities Commission requiring the plaintiff to 
include a newsletter published by another entity in its customer 
billing mailings infringed upon the company’s First Amendment 
rights.132  Specifically the Court stated: 
The Commission’s order forces appellant to disseminate . . . speech in envelopes that 
appellant owns and that bear appellant’s return address.  Such forced association with 
potentially hostile views burdens the expression of [different] views . . . and risks forcing 
appellant to speak where it would prefer to remain silent.133 
As such, Pacific Gas & Electric Co. might be placed in the line 
of expressive association cases that stands for the proposition that the 
First Amendment prohibits the government from requiring 
organizations to include certain messages in their expressive 
conduct.134 
The vast majority of expressive association cases arise from 
scenarios like the following: An individual seeks inclusion in an 
organization on the basis of some anti-discrimination statute.  The 
organization responds by asserting that such inclusion abridges its 
expressive association rights by requiring it to convey a message it 
does not wish to.135 
 
 128.  See Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 61 
(2006); Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Bos., 515 U.S. 557, 573 (1995); 
Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Utilities Comm’n of Cal., 475 U.S. 1, 32 (1986); PruneYard Shopping 
Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 99 (1980); Miami Herald Publ’g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 256 
(1974) W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 645 (1943). 
 129.  Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass'n, 544 U.S. 550, 573 (2005). 
 130.  Hurley, 515 U.S. at 573. 
 131.  See Johanns, 544 U.S. at 573. 
 132.  See Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 475 U.S. at 20–21. 
 133.  Id. at 18. 
 134.  For an explication of the concept of expressive association, see, for example, Dale 
Carpenter, Expressive Association and Anti-Discrimination Law After Dale: A Tripartite 
Approach, 85 MINN. L. REV. 1515, 1534–35 (2001). 
 135.  See, e.g., Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 615 (1984). 
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Neither the right not to speak—at issue in Wooley and Pacific 
Gas & Electric Co.—nor the right of expressive association is a perfect 
fit for the assertion made by copyright holders.  As an initial matter, 
the foundation of all of these is that the speaker should not be forced 
to convey a message with which he or she does not agree.136  In 
copyright infringement cases such as the NBC v. Romney 
hypothetical, NBC is not forced to say anything; rather, its words are 
merely copied.137  Moreover, while the right of expressive association 
may superficially appear to have some relevance, it is important to 
note that those cases consider the validity of the application of some 
statute to require one speaker to include the message of another in its 
speech.138  Here, NBC seeks to exclude its speech from Romney’s 
campaign advertisements.  There is simply no reading of the 
expressive association cases that grants NBC this degree of control 
over the content of Romney’s message. 
Even if one believes that these concepts have some relevance in 
copyright infringement suits, it is important to recall that the decision 
in Harper & Row, which read the right not to speak into copyright 
jurisprudence, was based, at least in part, on the right of first 
publication.139  Undergirding the right not to speak was a privacy 
interest that had previously inhered in common law copyright holders 
prior to publication.140  In his seminal article, Nimmer aptly notes that 
cases in which the content in question has already been published 
implicate no such privacy interest.141 
It is difficult to comprehend how publication of Colting’s novel 
could be perceived as a compulsion of speech by Salinger analogous to 
the government compulsion to express a particular viewpoint 
considered in Wooley.142  It is also clear that the facts presented in 
Salinger were markedly different from those in Harper & Row.  In 
Salinger, the alleged infringement was the writing and publication of 
a sequel rather than the copying and scooping of an important portion 
of a text prepublication, as was the case in Harper & Row.  
Nonetheless, the Second Circuit found that the dispute over 
 
 136.  See supra notes 130–133 and accompanying text.  
 137.  For a philosophical argument that all copyright infringement constitutes compelled 
speech in derogation of the copyright owner’s autonomy, see Abraham Drassinower, Copyright 
Infringement as Compelled Speech, in NEW FRONTIERS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY (Annabelle Lever ed., 2012). 
 138.  See supra notes 130–135 and accompanying text. 
 139.  See Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 560 (1985). 
 140.  See Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Utilities Comm’n of Cal., 475 U.S. 1, 34 (1986) 
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
 141.  See Nimmer, supra note 35, at 1191. 
 142.  See Deidré A. Keller, Recognizing the Derivative Works Right as a Moral Right: A 
Case Comparison and Proposal, 63 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 511, 536–38 (2013).   
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publication of 60 Years Later: Coming Through the Rye implicated the 
right not to speak.143  That decision was inconsistent with both the 
First Amendment jurisprudence underlying the right not to speak and 
the case extending that concept into copyright. 
In a suit between Romney and NBC over the Romney 
campaign’s use of NBC’s footage, basing a finding for NBC on the 
right not to speak would be tantamount to saying that NBC has the 
right not to speak in certain contexts or the right not to have its 
speech associated with a particular candidate or party.  NBC, in its 
televised broadcast, had already spoken.  The only remaining question 
is whether NBC should be able to stop the Romney campaign from 
repeating that speech to further its political objectives.  Does NBC 
have the right to control the content of Romney’s political message 
through the assertion of its copyright?  In a sense, answering this 
question requires consideration of whether we privilege NBC’s 
copyright or Romney’s right to convey his political message in the 
manner of his choosing.  In other words, a satisfactory answer 
requires us to squarely address the issues that arise when the 
proprietary interests of copyright meet the free speech interests 
embodied in the First Amendment. 
IV. THE COPYRIGHT APPROACH TO NBC V. ROMNEY: DO THE INTERNAL 
SAFEGUARDS PROTECT THE FIRST AMENDMENT INTERESTS? 
Courts have consistently held that First Amendment scrutiny 
in the context of copyright infringement suits is unnecessary.144  
 
 143.  See Salinger v. Colting, 607 F.3d 68, 81–82 (2d Cir. 2010). 
 144.  See, e.g., Walt Disney Prods. v. Air Pirates, 581 F.2d 751, 758–59 (9th Cir. 1978), 
cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1132 (1979) (“[D]efendants’ [First Amendment] claim can be dismissed 
without a lengthy discussion . . . .”); Ass’n of Am. Med. Colls. v. Princeton Review, Inc., 332 F. 
Supp. 2d 11, 20 (D.D.C. 2004) (“The First Amendment does not require that copyrighted works 
be published or made available to particular persons.” (citing Stewart, 495 U.S. 207, 228–29 
(1990))); Video Pipeline, Inc. v. Buena Vista Home Entm’t, Inc., 192 F. Supp. 2d 321, 346–47 
(D.N.J. 2002) (rejecting the Defendant’s First Amendment argument holding, “[c]opyright laws 
are thus not restrictions on speech, as ‘copyright laws, of course, protect only the form of 
expression and not the ideas expressed.’” (quoting N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 
726 (1971) (Brennan, J., concurring))); Lish v. Harper’s Magazine Found., 807 F. Supp. 1090, 
1105 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (holding that the idea-expression dichotomy and fair use are sufficient to 
protect any First Amendment interests not fully alleviated by the ability to quote purely factual 
information); Consumer Union of the U.S., Inc. v. The New Regina Corp., 664 F. Supp. 753, 761 
n.10 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (rejecting Defendant’s First Amendment argument stating “[t]he 
idea/expression dichotomy embodied in copyright ‘strike[s] a definitional balance between 
the First Amendment and the Copyright Act by permitting free communication of facts while 
still protecting an author's expression.’” (quoting Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation 
Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 556 (1985))); United States v. Bodin, 375 F. Supp. 1265, 1267–68 (W.D. 
Okla. 1974) (“We fail to see as any protected first amendment right a privilege to usurp the 
benefits [of the copyright holder’s efforts].”). 
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According to the Supreme Court, “copyright’s idea/expression 
dichotomy ‘strike[s] a definitional balance between the First 
Amendment and the Copyright Act by permitting free communication 
of facts while still protecting an author’s expression.’”145  The D.C. 
Circuit later stated, “copyrights are categorically immune from 
challenges under the First Amendment.”146  While the Supreme Court 
has articulated a more nuanced approach,147 its recent decision in 
Golan seems to support the notion that the application of the First 
Amendment in the context of copyright cases is only appropriate when 
the idea-expression dichotomy and fair use fail to protect the free 
speech interests.148  Therefore, any assertion that a court ought to 
approach a copyright suit from the perspective of the First 
Amendment must begin with a consideration of the viability of these 
internal safeguards. 
A. Idea-Expression Dichotomy: Considering the Copyrightability of 
News and Infringement by Reproduction 
The first aspect of copyright law asserted as protective of First 
Amendment interests is the idea-expression dichotomy.149  The  
idea-expression dichotomy began as a judge-made principle.150  In 
1880, the case Baker v. Selden151 introduced the concept to American 
law.152  Section 102(b) of the Copyright Act codified the idea-
expression dichotomy, stating: “In no case does copyright protection 
for an original work of authorship extend to any idea, procedure, 
process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery, 
regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, 
or embodied in such work.”153  The inclusion of the word “discovery” in 
 
 145.  Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S 539, 556 (1985) (quoting 
Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 723 F.2d 195, 203 (2d Cir. 1983), rev’d, 471 
U.S. 539 (1985)). 
 146.  Eldred v. Reno, 239 F.3d 372, 375 (D.C. Cir. 2001), aff’d, 537 U.S. 186 (2003). 
 147.  See Eldred v. Reno, 537 U.S. 186, 221 (2003) (“We recognize that the D.C. Circuit 
spoke too broadly when it declared copyrights ‘categorically immune from challenges under 
the First Amendment.’” (quoting Eldred v. Reno, 239 F.3d at 375)). 
 148.  See Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873, 890 (2012) (describing the traditional contours 
of copyright as the idea-expression dichotomy and the fair use defense and noting that the Tenth 
Circuit’s broader reading of the term was incorrect). 
 149.  See id. 
 150.  See Edward Samuels, The Idea-Expression Dichotomy in Copyright Law, 56 TENN. 
L. REV. 321, 325 (1989).   
 151.  101 U.S. 99 (1880). 
 152.  See Samuels, supra note 150, at 326 (“The idea-expression dichotomy in America is 
said to have originated in the United States Supreme Court case of Baker v. Selden.”). 
 153.  17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2012). 
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the statute demonstrates that copyright does not extend to the facts 
contained in an otherwise copyrightable work.154 
It has long been held that the facts conveyed in a news report 
are “publici juris; . . . the history of the day.”155  In International News 
Service v. Associated Press,156 the Supreme Court said: 
It is not to be supposed that the framers of the Constitution, when they empowered 
Congress “to promote the progress of science and useful arts, by securing for limited 
times to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings and 
discoveries” (Const., art. I, § 8, par. 8), intended to confer upon one who might happen to 
be the first to report a historic event the exclusive right for any period to spread the 
knowledge of it.157 
However, the form of the news report is copyrightable.158  This is true 
whether the news is in the form of an article159 or a television 
broadcast.160 
It is important to note that, while courts often hail the  
idea-expression dichotomy as one of the safeguards that protect First 
Amendment interests, in cases raising the First Amendment as a 
defense to infringement courts tend to disregard the concept almost 
entirely and rely instead on the fair use defense.161  If the alleged 
infringing content is an exact reproduction of the copyrighted content, 
the idea-expression dichotomy can only mitigate a finding of 
infringement if the merger doctrine applies.162  The merger doctrine 
 
 154.  See 2 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 2.11 
(Matthew Bender, rev. ed.). Another way of articulating the same concept, that facts are not 
copyrightable, is by making reference to the Copyright Act’s definition of copyrightable subject 
matter as “original works of authorship.” See 17 U.S.C § 102(a) (emphasis added). See, e.g., Feist 
Publ’n, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv., Co., 499 U.S. 340, 363 (1991) (finding that a white pages 
directory was not copyrightable because it merely reproduced existing facts in an unoriginal 
manner, that is in alphabetical order). This article addresses this concept by way of reference to 
the idea-expression dichotomy because courts routinely make reference to the dichotomy as one 
of the two internal safeguards for First Amendment concerns. Id. at 350. 
 155.  Int’l News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 234 (1918) (emphasis added). 
 156.  Id. 
 157.  Id. 
 158.  See Wainwright Sec., Inc. v. Wall St. Transcript Corp., 558 F.2d 91, 95–96 (2d Cir. 
1977). 
 159.  See id. at 95. 
 160.  See, e.g., Ga. TV Co. v. TV News Clips, Inc., 718 F. Supp. 939, 946 (N.D. Ga. 1989) 
(“[C]opyright protection attaches to the broadcast feature only when the first copy of the 
transmission is made.”). 
 161.  See, e.g., Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1260 (2001); 
Salinger v. Colting, 607 F.3d 68, 83 (2010). Note also, that none of the decisions in which a claim 
of copyright infringement is asserted in the context of a political campaign includes any 
discussion of the idea expression dichotomy. See infra notes 184–194, 214–223 and 
accompanying text. 
 162.  See, e.g., Scott Abrahamson, Seen One, Seen Them All? Making Sense of the 
Copyright Merger Doctrine, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1125, 1126–27 (1998). 
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applies when there are so few possible forms of expression for a 
particular idea that the idea and expression merge.163  Some 
commentators and courts have questioned whether the merger 
doctrine ought to apply to visual works at all.164 
Many academics have considered whether the idea-expression 
dichotomy functions to advance First Amendment interests.165  But 
would the idea-expression dichotomy allow the Romney campaign to 
use the content in question in this fictional case?  The foregoing brief 
review of idea-expression jurisprudence demonstrates that the answer 
to that inquiry is, simply, no.  As an initial matter, the content in 
question, though based upon facts, is copyrightable.166  The  
idea-expression dichotomy cannot assist in the infringement analysis 
because Romney used an exact reproduction of the copyrighted 
content, and the merger doctrine, which has not yet allowed the 
copying of a television news broadcast, is unlikely to be helpful. 
Some might argue that even if the idea-expression dichotomy is 
unlikely to serve as a defense after the fact, it ought to have been 
instructive to the Romney campaign beforehand.  That is, the  
idea-expression dichotomy delineated what the campaign could  
do—utilize the facts reported in NBC’s broadcast—and what it could 
not do—reproduce, distribute, or display the broadcast itself.  
However, whether Romney could have gotten around the potential 
copyright problem is not at issue here; the question is whether the 
Copyright Act should operate to require him to do so.  Once the 
campaign chooses to utilize the footage, should NBC have the ability 
to use its copyright to enjoin the campaign from doing so or recover 
damages for that use?  If we believe that speech undertaken in the 
context of political campaigns is deserving of the greatest degree of 
freedom then the answer to this question must be no.  In order to 
determine whether a court approaching this issue would arrive at that 
answer, we must consider the merits of the infringement analysis. 
B. The Infringement Analysis 
Section 106 of the Copyright Act grants the exclusive rights of 
reproduction, distribution, and public display, among others, to the 
 
 163.  See id. at 1126.  
 164.  See Michael D. Murray, Copyright, Originality, and the End of Scènes à Faire and 
Merger Doctrines for Visual Works, 58 BAYLOR L. REV. 779, 787, 858 (2006) (“[T]here are myriad 
possible ways to express ideas visually . . . .”). 
 165.  See, e.g., Alfred C. Yen, A First Amendment Perspective on the Idea/Expression 
Dichotomy and Copyright in a Work’s “Total Concept and Feel,” 38 EMORY L.J. 393, 396–97 
(1989). 
 166.  See supra Part IV.A.  
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copyright owner.167  One need not copy the entire copyrighted work to 
be liable for infringement.168  In fact, there is no bright line rule as to 
what portion of a copyrighted work an alleged infringer must 
reproduce to result in a finding of infringement.169  Rather, courts 
consider both quantitative and qualitative taking; that is what portion 
of the content was taken and how important the portion copied was, 
relative to the remainder of the work.170 
There is no question that the Romney campaign reproduced a 
portion of the NBC broadcast without its authorization.  Although the 
advertisement only utilized thirty seconds of the broadcast, because 
there is no definitive amount of content which must be taken in order 
for there to be a finding of infringement, it is entirely possible that the 
advertisement in question would be found to infringe NBC’s exclusive 
rights. 
C. Fair Use 
Fair use, like the idea-expression dichotomy, is a common law 
principle.171  Folsom v. Marsh was the first US case to apply the 
principle.172  The 1976 Act first codified fair use in the statute.173  
Section 107 of the statute reads: 
[T]he fair use of a copyrighted work . . . is not an infringement of copyright. In 
determining whether the use made of a work in any particular case is a fair use the 
factors to be considered shall include—  
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial 
nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes; 
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work; 
 
 167.  17 U.S.C. § 106 (2012). 
 168.  See, e.g., Iowa State Univ. Research Found., Inc. v. Am. Broad. Cos., Inc., 463 F. 
Supp. 902, 903 (S.D.N.Y. 1978). 
 169.  See Ringgold v. Black Entm’t Television, Inc., 126 F.3d 70, 74–77 (2d Cir. 1997) 
(explaining the concept of de minimis taking in the context of copyright infringement and 
ultimately holding that the appearance of some portion of Plaintiff’s poster in a total of less than 
thirty seconds of the television show in question was not a de minimis taking); see also 
Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films, 410 F.3d 792, 801–02 (6th Cir. 2005) (holding that 
the sampling of two seconds of a song constituted actionable infringement); Fisher v. Dees, 794 
F.2d 432, 434 n.2 (9th Cir. 1986) (“[A] taking is considered de minimis only if it is so meager and 
fragmentary that the average audience would not recognize the appropriation.” (citing Elsemere 
Music, Inc. v. Nat’l Broad. Co., 482 F. Supp. 741, 744 (S.D.N.Y. 1980))). For a recent analysis of 
the development of the de minimis doctrine, see Peter S. Menell and Ben Depoorter, Using Fee 
Shifting to Promote Fair Use and Fair Licensing, 102 CAL. L. REV. 53, 63–64 (2014). 
 170.  Bridgeport Music, Inc., 410 F.3d at 797–98. 
 171.  See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 475 n.27 (1984) 
(describing the history of the fair use doctrine in American case law). 
 172.  9 F. Cas. 342, 345, 348 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4901). 
 173.  17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012). 
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(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted 
work as a whole; and 
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted 
work.174 
Although the listed factors are nonexhaustive, they tend to 
predominate courts’ fair use decisions.175  Fair use is an affirmative 
defense.176  Moreover, fair use is a mixed question of law and fact,177 
which requires case-by-case analysis.178  Given the fact-sensitive 
nature of the fair use inquiry, courts have long held that summary 
adjudication of fair use is improper.179 
1. The Purpose and Character of the Use 
To determine whether this factor favors the copyright owner or 
the alleged infringer, courts often consider (1) whether the use is 
commercial or for nonprofit or educational purposes180 and (2) whether 
the use is transformative.181  The nonprofit nature of the alleged 
infringement is not dispositive.182 
Courts have split on the issue of whether the use of a 
copyrighted work in a political campaign is commercial for purposes of 
the fair use analysis.  In Keep Thomson Governor Committee v. 
Citizens for Gallen Committee,183  the United States District Court for 
the District of New Hampshire considered whether the Defendant’s 
campaign advertisement, which incorporated fifteen seconds of 
Plaintiff’s song, constituted copyright infringement.184  The Defendant 
asserted that its use constituted fair use.185  Regarding the character 
 
 174.  Id. 
 175.  See Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of U.S. Copyright Fair Use Opinions, 1978-
2005, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 549, 561–64 (2008). 
 176.  See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, 510 U.S. 569, 590 (1994). For a full explication of 
how fair use came to be understood as an affirmative defense in American law, see Ned Snow, 
The Forgotten Right of Fair Use, 62 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 135, 159–60 (2011). 
 177.  See Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 560 (1985). 
 178.  See id. at 549. 
 179.  See, e.g., DC Comics Inc. v. Reel Fantasy, Inc., 696 F.2d 24, 28 (2d Cir. 1982 ) (“The 
four factors listed in Section 107 raise essentially factual issues and, as the district court 
correctly noted, are normally questions for the jury.”); see also Meeropol v. Nizer, 560 F.2d 1061, 
1069 (2d Cir. 1977). But see Mattel Inc. v. Walking Mountain Prods., 353 F.3d 792, 800 (9th Cir. 
2003) (“Where material facts are not in dispute, fair use is appropriately decided on summary 
judgment.” (citing Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc., 471 U.S. at 560)). 
 180.  See Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc., 471 U.S. at 562. 
 181.  See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 587–88. 
 182.  Id. at 584 (“[T]he mere fact that a use is educational and not for profit does not 
insulate it from a finding of infringement . . . .”). 
 183.  457 F. Supp. 957 (D.N.H. 1978). 
 184.  Id. 
 185.  See id. at 960. 
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of the use, the Court stated, “The use by the defendant . . . is clearly 
part of a political campaign message, noncommercial in nature . . . .”186  
Nearly thirty years later, the United States District Court for the 
Southern District of New York also concluded that the use of 
copyrighted content in the context of a political advertisement was not 
commercial.187  More recently, the United States District Court for the 
Central District of California came to the opposite conclusion.188  In 
Henley v. Devore,189 the court considered whether the use of two 
copyrighted songs in political advertisements constituted fair use.190  
The court acknowledged the prior precedent but explained that, “in 
the Ninth Circuit ‘monetary gain is not the sole criterion[,] 
particularly in a setting where profit is ill-measured in dollars.’”191  
The court went on to say that the defendants “stood to gain publicity 
and campaign donations from their use of” the copyrighted songs;192 
therefore, the use was commercial.193 
A use is transformative if it serves a purpose different from the 
copyrighted work.194  In this sense, this factor overlaps with the effect 
on the market of the work because a transformative work will not act 
as a market substitute for the copyrighted work.195  The classic case of 
a transformative use is a parody using a copyrighted work as the basis 
for the creation of a new work.196  In Campbell v. Acuff Rose,197 the 
Supreme Court held that a parody of Roy Orbison’s song “Oh, Pretty 
Woman” was a fair use.198  In Campbell, the Court defined a parody as 
“the use of some elements of a prior author’s composition to create a 
new one that, at least in part, comments on that author’s works.”199  
The Court assumed that the goal of any parody is to amuse its 
audience,200 even if the joke might not be to the Court’s taste.201 
 
 186.  Id. at 961. 
 187.  See Mastercard Int’l Inc. v. Nader 2000 Primary Comm., No. 00 Civ.6068 (GBD), 
2004 WL 434404, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 8, 2004).  
 188.  See Henley v. DeVore, 733 F.Supp. 2d 1144, 1159 (C.D. Cal 2010). 
 189.  733 F. Supp. 2d 1144 (C.D. Cal. 2010). 
 190.  See id. at 1150. 
 191.  Id. at 1159 (alterations in original) (quoting Worldwide Church of God v. Phila. 
Church of God, Inc., 227 F.3d 1110, 1117 (9th Cir. 2000)). 
 192.  Id. 
 193.  See id. 
 194.  See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994). 
 195.  See id. 
 196.  See id. 
 197.  Id. 
 198.  See id. at 572. 
 199.  Id. at 580 (citing Fisher v. Dees, 794 F.2d 432, 437 (9th Cir. 1986); MCA, Inc. v. 
Wilson, 677 F.2d 180, 185 (2d Cir. 1981)). 
 200.  See id. at 597. 
 201.  See id. at 582. 
524 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. [Vol. 16:3:497 
The Romney ad is obviously not a parody.  First, the 
advertisement does not comment upon the NBC broadcast.  Rather, it 
comments on the subject of that broadcast—Newt Gingrich.  
Moreover, the advertisement consists solely of the snippet in question, 
adding no new content. Its goal is not humor.  Although the Supreme 
Court has cautioned against declining to find fair use just because the 
court does not get the joke, it seems clear on its face that there is no 
joke intended here. 
Since Campbell, a number of lower courts have found 
transformative uses outside of the context of parody.  In both Kelly v. 
Arriba Soft Corp.202 and Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc.,203 the 
Ninth Circuit held that the alleged infringer engaged in 
transformative use when it provided thumbnails of the copyright 
owner’s images in its search engine results.204  In Núñez v. Caribbean 
International News Corp.,205 the United States Court of Appeals for 
the First Circuit held that a newspaper’s use of a photograph of a 
model originally taken as a part of her portfolio was a transformative 
use because that use did not interfere with the market for the 
photograph as a portion of a fashion portfolio.206  Similarly, the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has held that the use of 
concert posters in a book detailing the history of a band was a 
transformative fair use.207 
If NBC’s purpose is articulated broadly (e.g., providing 
information to the polity), there is a colorable argument that Romney’s 
use would fall within this ambit.  While NBC’s motivation behind 
providing the information about Gingrich’s ethics dilemmas might be 
completely different from Romney’s, there is a way in which the 
asserted purposes may overlap.  To find otherwise, a court would have 
to consider and credit Romney’s political motivations. 
Framed within the context of Romney’s campaign for office, it 
seems clear that Romney’s advertisement serves a purpose quite 
different from NBC’s purpose in producing the original, underlying 
content.  While NBC’s purpose in publishing the broadcast was the 
contemporaneous dissemination of newsworthy facts, Romney’s is the 
dissemination of a political message designed to aid his quest to obtain 
the Republican nomination for the Presidency.  While asserting the 
precise nature of that political message requires some speculation, 
 
 202.  336 F.3d 811 (9th Cir. 2003). 
 203.  508 F.3d 1146 (9th Cir. 2007). 
 204.  See Perfect 10, Inc., 508 F.3d at 1165; Kelly, 336 F.3d at 819. 
 205.  235 F.3d 18 (1st Cir. 2000). 
 206.  See id. at 25. 
 207.  See Bill Graham Archives v. Dorling Kindersley Ltd., 448 F.3d 605, 609–12 (2d Cir. 
2006). 
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there is no question that Romney’s purpose was not the 
contemporaneous dissemination of newsworthy facts.  As an initial 
matter, the events underlying the broadcast took place some fifteen 
years prior to the Romney advertisement.208  As such, the purpose of 
Romney’s use is distinct from that of NBC’s initial production of the 
broadcast.209 
To the extent that a court hearing a copyright infringement 
suit will consider the First Amendment as a limit upon copyright, it 
will generally do so based on the nature of the alleged infringer’s 
use.210  A number of courts have held that a use involving content that 
is of great public concern weighs in favor of the alleged infringer.211  
Moreover, courts have held that where a case implicates the First 
Amendment, the fair use doctrine is to be given a wider reading.212  
However, no court has ever held that the use of copyrighted content in 
a campaign advertisement is fair use as a matter of law.  In fact, in 
Browne v. McCain,213 the McCain presidential campaign filed a motion 
to dismiss, asserting that use of the song “Running on Empty” in its 
advertisement constituted fair use as a matter of law.214  The Central 
District of California denied the motion explaining, 
[The Republican National Committee] has not established that Plaintiff’s claim is 
barred, as a matter of law, under the fair use doctrine. The mere fact that Plaintiff’s 
claim is based on Defendants’ use of his copyrighted work in a political campaign does 
not bar Plaintiff’s claim as a matter of law.215 
 
 208.  See Jack Mirkinson, NBC Demands Mitt Romney Take Down Ad That Uses Tom 
Brokaw Footage, THE HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 28, 2012, 1:14 PM, updated Jan. 28, 2012, 4:50 
PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/01/28/nbc-mitt-romney-tom-brokaw-ad_n_1239107. 
html. 
 209.  See Int’l News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215 (1918). 
 210.  See, e.g., Nat’l Rifle Ass’n of Am. v. Handgun Control Fed’n of Ohio, 15 F.3d 559, 562 
(6th Cir. 1994) (“This contrast with commercial activity helps show that the purpose and 
character of HCF’s use is far removed from that which the copyright law centrally protects and 
instead falls within the realm of the designated fair use purposes. The document was used 
primarily in exercising HCF’s First Amendment speech rights to comment on public issues and 
to petition the government regarding legislation.”). 
 211.  See id. (“The scope of the fair use doctrine is wider when the use relates to issues of 
public concern.” (citing Consumers Union of U.S., Inc. v. Gen. Signal Corp., 724 F.2d 1044, 1040 
(2d Cir. 1983))); see also Hustler Magazine v. Moral Majority, 606 F. Supp. 1526, 1526–36 (C.D. 
Cal. 1985). 
 212.  See, e.g., Wojnarowicz v. Am. Family Ass’n, 745 F. Supp. 130, 146–47 (S.D.N.Y. 
1990). 
 213.  612 F. Supp. 2d 1125 (C.D. Cal. 2009). 
 214.  See id. at 1129–30. 
 215.  Id. at 1130. 
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The McCain campaign ultimately settled the litigation.216  
Likewise, in Long v. Ballantine,217 the United States District Court for 
the Eastern District of North Carolina denied an alleged infringer’s 
motion for judgment as a matter of law on the issue of fair use where 
the defendant used plaintiff’s photograph in the context of a campaign 
advertisement.218  The Long court specifically held that fair use is 
determined on a case-by-case basis, and, therefore, the determination 
of this issue at trial was dispositive.219  The Long decision also 
highlights an additional risk an alleged infringer in a copyright 
infringement suit faces—the award of attorney’s fees and costs.220  
Even though the jury only awarded damages of $500,221 the plaintiff 
was able to recover over $70,000 in attorney’s fees and costs.222  Such 
decisions give any potential copyright defendant pause. 
In the absence of a more robust consideration of the First 
Amendment interests at stake, a court would likely find that the use 
of NBC’s copyrighted footage by the Romney campaign is a 
commercial use.  The question of transformativeness, however, is a 
mixed bag given the mere copying without parody (weighing in favor 
of NBC) but the arguably different purpose from the original use 
(weighing in favor of the Romney campaign).  Ultimately, the “purpose 
and character of use” likely weighs slightly in favor of NBC or is 
neutral. 
2. The Nature of the Copyrighted Work 
Courts have held that the nature of the copyrighted work is of 
the least import in the fair use analysis.223  When considering this 
factor, courts ask whether the copyrighted work is the type of work 
that is at the heart of copyright protection, such as a fictional or 
artistic work.224  In explaining this factor the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has said, 
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[W]orks such as original songs, motion pictures, and photographs taken for aesthetic 
purposes, are creative in nature and thus fit squarely within the core of copyright 
protection. . . . But works such as news broadcasts and news video footage are more 
factual in nature and thus are more conducive to fair use.225 
Therefore, where the work in question is fact-based, this factor is 
likely to favor the party asserting the fair use defense. 
While the work at issue here is copyrightable,226 the breadth of 
copyright protection for news is necessarily limited by the 
uncopyrightable nature of the facts reported.227  Therefore, the 
copyrighted content in question here is likely not at the heart of 
copyright protection.  This factor will likely weigh in favor of the 
Romney campaign. 
3. The Amount and Substantiality Taken 
To decide whether this factor weighs in favor of the copyright 
owner or the alleged infringer, courts undertake both a qualitative 
and a quantitative analysis.228  They consider both the proportion of 
the work taken relative to the totality of the work and whether the 
alleged infringer took what constitutes the heart of the work, such 
that the infringed content acts as a market substitute for the 
copyrighted work.229  In that sense, the third and fourth factors inform 
each other.230  While there have been cases where the complete 
reproduction of a work constituted fair use,231 there is no definitive 
quantitative amount of content that will not potentially result in 
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infringement liability.232  Notably, fair use cases rarely turn upon the 
quantitative measure of the allegedly infringed content.233 
Here, the Romney campaign could argue that it only used 
thirty seconds of a much longer broadcast.234  Of course, as noted in 
the above infringement analysis, there is no bright line rule as to what 
portion of a work may be used without infringing.  To properly 
consider the qualitative aspect of this element, we must know more 
about the underlying broadcast.  For example, if the snippet used by 
the campaign was the night’s lead story, the portion used could 
arguably constitute the heart of the broadcast.  A court arriving at 
such a conclusion is likely to hold that this factor favors NBC.  While 
it is hard to say whether this factor would favor Romney or NBC, it is 
pretty clear that the factual record would have to be developed on this 
point.  The same is true of the fourth factor. 
4. The Effect on the Market for the Work 
In evaluating this factor, courts consider not only the direct 
effect of the alleged infringer’s conduct, but also whether similar 
conduct by others left unchecked would harm the market for the 
work.235  A court might inquire as to whether there is a market to 
license the content, particularly when it represents only a small 
portion of the overall work.236  At bottom, if there is a market to 
license the content, courts tend to find that unauthorized uses harm 
that market.237 
Any court hearing a dispute between Romney and NBC and 
considering a fair use defense will be interested in whether NBC 
licenses snippets such as the one in question here.  If it does—and 
particularly if it does regularly and at a reasonable rate—the court is 
likely to find that uses like Romney’s, if unchecked, will harm the 
market for those licenses. 
5. Fair Use: Conclusion 
While it is difficult to predict precisely what a court considering 
the fictional case of NBC v. Romney would decide as to the fair use 
question, there are some issues that can be resolved definitively and 
others that ought to give us pause.  First, because fair use is 
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determined on a case-by-case basis and because the facts presented by 
a dispute between Romney and NBC do not necessitate a finding one 
way or the other, it is clear that a defendant pursuing such litigation 
undertakes a significant risk.  This is particularly true in light of the 
potential for the award of statutory damages and attorney’s fees.238  In 
addition, it is clear that deciding whether the campaign’s conduct 
constitutes fair use requires some development of the factual record.  
This means that a court is unlikely to resolve this dispute until at 
least the summary judgment stage.  Again, a defendant undertaking 
such litigation would have to consider the expense associated with 
litigating a copyright infringement suit through summary judgment, 
irrespective of the merits.  Others have considered the chilling effect 
associated with the nature of the fair use determination.239  The 
analysis undertaken here demonstrates that effect. 
The idea-expression dichotomy is unlikely to assist our fictional 
defendant; technical infringement is clear, and a finding of fair use is 
far from a foregone conclusion.  On the other hand, First Amendment 
jurisprudence cautions that political speech requires the greatest 
protection, and the Copyright Act, as applied in this context, is 
arguably unconstitutionally vague.240  Approaching this question from 
the perspective of the Copyright Act would allow content owners to do 
what candidates themselves could not do without implicating the First 
Amendment; that is, suppress speech that is relevant to a candidate’s 
qualifications for office.  This divergence in potential outcomes 
depends solely upon whether one approaches the question from the 
perspective of the Copyright Act or the First Amendment.  This 
demonstrates that the internal safeguards, as ordinarily utilized, do 
not fully protect the free speech interests at stake when copyright 
holders allege infringement in the context of a political campaign.  
What follows is an attempt to imbue fair use with the ability to protect 
free speech in this context.  Doing so will require courts to presume 
fair use when the alleged infringement occurs in the context of a 
political campaign. 
V. AN ATTEMPT AT HARMONIZATION: REALIZING THE FIRST 
AMENDMENT POTENTIAL OF TRANSFORMATIVENESS 
In order for the fair use doctrine to protect the free speech 
interests at stake in a case like the fictional dispute between NBC and 
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Romney, both procedural and substantive problems must be 
addressed.  On the procedural side, the hesitation of courts to 
summarily adjudicate the issue of fair use presents a significant 
hurdle.241  It is untenable for a political campaign to litigate a 
copyright infringement suit in the absence of some reasonable 
expectation that the matter can be resolved with little fact-finding.  A 
rebuttable presumption of fair use in this context would address this 
issue, recognizing that lengthy adjudications around issues of 
protected political speech during the heat of a campaign are anathema 
to the protection provided by the First Amendment.242 
On the substantive side, the Supreme Court has already 
provided a rhetorical approach that could prove useful in this context: 
tranformativeness.  In Campbell v. Acuff-Rose the Court developed the 
concept of tranformativeness to explain parody as fair use.243  As noted 
above, lower courts employ this analysis in cases that have nothing to 
do with parody.244  Utilizing that concept to evaluate fair use in 
political campaigns makes even more sense because transformative 
use as articulated in Campbell is protective of First Amendment 
interests.245  Specifically, courts treat parodies as potentially 
important social commentary.246  Political speech—speech undertaken 
by a candidate for political office in furtherance of his  
candidacy—deserves at least as much breathing room as parody.  
Therefore, the suggestion here is that courts considering allegations of 
copyright infringement in the context of political campaigns recognize 
the First Amendment interests at stake by expanding the notion of 
tranformativeness to encompass such uses. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
This Article questions the decisions holding that the fair use 
defense and idea-expression dichotomy, as currently implemented, are 
sufficient to address the First Amendment issues that can arise in the 
context of copyright infringement suits.  It asserts that there are 
instances, such as when the alleged infringement occurs in the context 
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of a political campaign, in which the First Amendment is squarely 
implicated and the internal safeguards are insufficient.  In order to 
demonstrate this, this Article has undertaken a thought experiment 
approaching NBC’s efforts to stop the Romney campaign from using a 
portion of an old television news broadcast in an advertisement from 
the perspective of the First Amendment and, in the alternative, from 
the perspective of recent copyright jurisprudence.  Undertaking these 
analyses side-by-side shows that there are circumstances in which the 
internal safeguards, as currently deployed, are plainly inadequate.  In 
such circumstances, courts ought to either explicitly consider the First 
Amendment as a defense or fortify the fair use analysis by reference to 
First Amendment principles. 
 
